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of the Terry doc trine lies in its abuse in
cases where the state may seek to dignify
an otherwise invalid investigatory procedure. The narrow holding in Terry was
originally intended as justification for
good faith searches, limited in scope to a
pat down for weapons in a situation reasonably perceived by the officer as presenting immediate danger. The gist of
Terry is good-faith preemption of hostile
citizen reaction to a lawful police stop;
Terry was not envisioned as applying an
excuse for bad faith or sloppy police work
and the "stop and frisk" perceived by the
Supreme Court was clearly not meant to
be a habitual law enforcement procedure.
In Price, the court noted that the officer
had concededly acted solely on the basis
of the police broadcast and that he observed nothing in the course of his approaching the defendant which indicated
that he might be armed. The court distinguished Williams v. State, 19 Md.App.
204, 310 A.2d 593 (1973), where it
upheld a "stop and frisk"based on a similar radio alert together with other circumstances which were found sufficient to
give rise to the required reasonable suspicion. Specifically, in Williams, the fact
that the automobile was parked in the
same general vicinity only ninety minutes
after a shooting incident was a specific
and articulable fact which reasonably warranted the self-protective frisk, whereas in
Price the court was faced with the question whether the police broadcast alone
would give rise to this suspicion where the
offense which was the subject of the
broadcast had occured three weeks earlier
and in another part of the county. The
unaccompanied police broadcast was held
insufficient.
The rationale underlying Terry goes to
the legitimate interest of the state in protecting its law enforcement officers from
the inherent dangers involved in the conducting of investigations of those
suspected of possible criminal activities.
The cases following Terry have been
forced to apply a balancing test between
the rights of individuals to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures and
society's interest in protecting its police
from potential threatened violence when
such is the case. The difficult question to

which the court addressed itself in this
case is whether the frisk can be upheld at
a suppression hearing where the arresting
officer has no reason other than the
broadcast for conducting the frisk and
where the prosecution is unable to identify the source of the information bringing
about the alert. Through a delicate balancing of the interests outlined in Terry,
the court has chosen not to expand its
prior holding in Williams to encompass a
situation such as that in Price.
While it might legitimately be suggested that Price almost completely
deprives police officers of the right to conduct protective frisks solely on the basis
of police radio broadcasts alerting officers
of armed and dangerous suspects (who are
identified with certainty), officers in fear
of their safety may conduct such frisks if
they can point to any specific and articulable facts supporting the broadcast
(such as in Williams) which reasonably
leads them to conclude that criminal activity is afoot and that the subject of their
investigation is armed. Furthermore, such
a frisk based on the broadcast alone will
be upheld if the facts underlying the radio
alert are established by the state at the
suppression hearing. Price, while declining to extend the former rule, reaffirms
the self-protective frisk under appropriate
circumstances and at the same time
preserves the right of the people to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The narrow holding of Price requires only
that evidence seized as the result of an arrest made following a productive frisk for
weapons based solely on the radio broadcast must be suppressed both where the
accuracy underlying the broadcast cannot
be documented and in the absence of
other indicia of present danger.

T.V. Or Not
T.V.-Proof
OfVaIue
For Grand
Larceny
by John Jeffrey Ross

To obtain a conviction of a defendant
accused of grand larceny in the District of
Columbia, the Government must present
evidence that the property stolen was
worth at least $100.00. (See 22 D.C.
Code Sec. 2201). Such evidence should
include proof of the fair market value of
the item. This axiom appears to be too
simple to require judicial explanation, but
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
recently reversed a felony grand larceny
conviction because of the Government's
failure to establish the threshold value.
Williams v. United States, 376 A.2d 442
(D.C. App. 1977).
John Williams was convicted of grand
larceny after the Government convinced
the jury that he had taken a television set
(and other effects of negligible value). The
evidence showed that Mr. Williams sold
the television for $50.00 and then bought
it back for $100.00 in the hope of returning it to avoid prosecution. There was
further testimony by the complaining witness of the property's original purchase
value and state of repair.
Williams subsequently appealed this
conviction, claiming that the Government's evidence was insufficient to demonstrate a felony theft. In remanding the
case for a misdemeanor disposition the
Court of Appeals stated that the failure of
the Government's case was the reliance
on the evidence of only "a) physical presence of the items stolen and b) the
owner's statement of original cost." 376
A.2d at 443. The Court indicated that the
"fair market value" is defined as that
"price at which a willing seller and a will-
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ing buyer will trade." Id. Without this evidence of value, the jury's verdict would
not be based on articulable objective
facts. Even though the owner testified she
originally had paid $750.00 for the property and the accused (certainly not a willing buyer) paid $100.00 to repurchase
the television set, neither purchases were
indicative of fair market value.
The Court stated that the only departure from the strict rule of proof would be
where the "stolen property (1) had been
recently purchased at a price well in excess of $100.00; (2) was in 'mint condition' at the time of the theft; and (3) was
not subject to 'prompt depreCiation or obsolescence.' " 376 A.2d at 444.
The government's proof was thus sufficient to sustain a conviction only for petit
larceny, a misdemeanor. With this charge,
all that is necessary is for the government
to show that the stolen items had value.
The Court closed with an oblique
reference to what may be poor trial preparation on the part of the U.S. Attorney's
Office. It noted, at 376 A.2d 444 n. 3,
that there has been "a continuing indication of failure in governmental proof sufficient to establish a felony rather than a
misdemeanor in larceny cases of this
nature."

Merger
Doctrine
Examined
by John Jeffrey Ross

On July 13, 1974, a young woman was
allegedly raped in the District of Columbia. This event provoked a search by her
relatives and friends for some neighborhood justice. Mrs. Mary Harris, grandmother of the assault victim, accompanied
this crowd of vigilantes to a Washington
home wherein the rapist was thought to
reside. As two men from the group forced
their way through the front door they shot
down an innocent third party, Louis
Sisler, who tried to prevent their entry.
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Sisler died at an emergency room
shortly thereafter, but not before he provided, by way of admissible "spontaneous
utterances," testimony leading to the
murder and burglary convictions of the
assailants. See Harris v. United States,
373 A.2d 590 (D.C. App. 1977).
The tragiC events of that day have led
to further prosecutions, and the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals has recently
adjudicated the appeal of Mrs. Harris from
her convictions for conspiracy to commit
assault with a dangerous weapon, attempted first degree burglary while
armed, and felony murder. Mrs. Harris
had been brought to justice for her role in
aiding and abetting the forcible entry of
the murder victim's home and his shooting. Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34
(D.C. App. 1977).
On appeal, Mrs. Harris claimed that the
trial court erroneously resolved the
follOWing issues against her:

cerning accomplice guilt, the court saw as
dispositive numerous actions by Mrs. Harris indicative of her role as a motivating
force in the group's search for revenge
which led it to the scene. The court rejected her claim that her leaving the scene
prior to the murder was sufficient to avoid
criminal liability.
The court reasoned that absent an affirmative move to "disavow or defeat" the
criminal purpose, or "definite decisive"
steps shOWing complete abandonment of
the illegal undertaking, the departure was
ruled insufficient "as a matter of law" to
show withdrawal from the criminal enterprise. Id., at 38.
As to HarriS' liability in the felony
murder, the court stated that the killing
was within the scope of the burglary perpetrated by Harris and her prinCipals; a
natural and probable consequence of, and
not merely "coincident" to, the illegal en-

She further complained that the
offenses upon which the felony murder accusation was based should have been
merged with the homiCide, thus removing
support for the first degree murder conviction.

try. 377 A.2d at 37-38.
On the failure of the trial court to impanel, sua sponte, a second jury to hear
her insanity defense or to question veniremen of the present panel to determine
prejudice against this defense, the court
stated that Harris had abruptly changed
her defense tactics at trial by an untimely
assertion of the insanity defense; there
was no right to a second jury, and that absent a timely request by counsel for voir
dire on the insanity issue, the trial judge
did not abuse her discretion in the manner
in which she conducted the trial. Also
fatal to the appellant's claim was the absence of objection to the "manner and
method" of the court's use of the jury.
In addition, the court dismissed claims
that the prosecutor made statements of
such import as to prejudice the defense. It
was held that proper jury instructions
remedied their effect, and that a fair trial
was preserved. 377 A.2d at 39-40.

The court affirmed the convictions, indicating by a recital of the group's purposeful actions that the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the
government, clearly showed criminal
animus for revenge and armed, forcible
entry into the victim's home-thus sufficient evidence for attempted first degree
burglary while armed. [d., at 36-37. Con-

The final issue to be considered was
Mrs. Harris' claim that the felony murder
conviction must be reversed because the
offenses on which the felony murder was
based should have been merged into that
homicide as lesser included offenses. In
other words, she contended that 1) the
burglary was based upon the intent to
commit assault with a dangerous weapon;

'SuffiCiency of the evidence to sustain
accomplice guilt for attempted first
degree burglary;
2statements by the decedent admitted
against her;
3sufficiency of the evidence to show accomplice guilt for the first degree
felony murder;
4 refusal by the trial court to impanel,
sua sponte, a second jury to hear Mrs.
Harris' untimely insanity defense or to
conduct a voir dire of the jurors to
determine prejudice against such a
defense;
5 prejudical statements by the prosecutor concerning Mrs. Harris' insanity
defense, even though the trial court
provided instructions to mitigate their
impact.

